A model of gradual information disclosure

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.002zbMath1470.91046OpenAlexW3174470393MaRDI QIDQ2049479

Haibo Xu

Publication date: 25 August 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.002

zbMATH Keywords

private informationcommitmentinformation disclosuregradualismhold-up effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• Monotone games with positive spillovers
• Starting small and commitment
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Starting small and renegotiation
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Torture and the Commitment Problem
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Optimal deadlines for agreements
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting
• Gradualism and Irreversibility

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