Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2049488
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.007zbMath1470.91102OpenAlexW3183132636MaRDI QIDQ2049488
Publication date: 25 August 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.007
Pareto optimalitymanipulabilitystrategy-proofnessanonymitygroup strategy-proofnesssocial choice function
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives
- The proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem revisited
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness
- Further results on dictatorial domains
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Dictatorial domains
- Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.
- An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules
- When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- A stability property in social choice theory
- Logics in Artificial Intelligence
