Optimal delay in committees

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.008zbMath1470.91080OpenAlexW3180147161MaRDI QIDQ2049494

Wing Suen, Ettore Damiano, Hao Li

Publication date: 25 August 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.008

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic delay mechanismlocalized variations methodstart-and-stop

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

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