Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.009zbMath1470.91147OpenAlexW3179844581MaRDI QIDQ2049495

Eilon Solan, Chang Zhao

Publication date: 25 August 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.009

zbMATH Keywords

inspectiondynamic monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (1)

When (not) to publicize inspection results

Cites Work

• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Repeated delegation
• Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach
• Compliance and enforcement: Air pollution regulation in the U. S. steel industry
• From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information
• Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• On selecting the right agent

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