Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.07.001zbMath1470.91192OpenAlexW3183303414MaRDI QIDQ2049497

Fanqi Shi

Publication date: 25 August 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationinvestmentstable matchingsequential matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
• Stability in dynamic matching markets
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
• MULTIPERIOD MATCHING
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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