Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players
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Publication:2049499
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.003zbMath1470.91109OpenAlexW3185965946MaRDI QIDQ2049499
Publication date: 25 August 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.003
Noncooperative games (91A10) Utility theory (91B16) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (7)
On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests ⋮ Expectations-based loss aversion in contests ⋮ Optimal contest design: tuning the heat ⋮ On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests ⋮ Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns ⋮ Effort discrimination and curvature of contest technology in conflict networks ⋮ Centralized versus decentralized contests with risk-averse players
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