Simple collective equilibria in stopping games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.102467zbMath1470.91061OpenAlexW3119891233MaRDI QIDQ2050982

Arkadi Predtetchinski, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 1 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.102467

zbMATH Keywords

votingsubgame perfect equilibriumstationary equilibriumcoalition formationcollective choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Games of timing (91A55)

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