On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests
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Publication:2050987
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102472zbMath1470.91018OpenAlexW3124212271MaRDI QIDQ2050987
Publication date: 1 September 2021
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102472
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
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- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
- Contests with productive effort
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- Performance‐maximizing large contests
- All-Pay Contests
- On the optimal design of biased contests
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