The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102474zbMath1476.91056OpenAlexW3124419171MaRDI QIDQ2050988

Surekha Rao, Achille Basile, K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao

Publication date: 1 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102474

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsstrategy-proofnessindifferencesocial choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference ⋮ Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice

Cites Work

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• A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
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• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
• Voting by Committees

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