Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102478zbMath1470.91130OpenAlexW3128809770MaRDI QIDQ2050991

René Kirkegaard

Publication date: 1 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102478

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric auctionsprofit ranking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, English auctions
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
• Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder
• Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
• Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
• Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions

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