School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102496zbMath1468.91100OpenAlexW3132198061MaRDI QIDQ2051001

Flip Klijn, Paula Jaramillo, Çağatay Kayı

Publication date: 1 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102496

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityschool choiceNash implementationrank-priority mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
• Constrained school choice
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• What you don't know can help you in school assignment
• The modified Boston mechanism
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
• On Representatives of Subsets
• An $n^{5/2} $ Algorithm for Maximum Matchings in Bipartite Graphs
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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