Dynamics and stability of evolutionary optimal strategies in duopoly

DOI10.1007/s10100-020-00713-6OpenAlexW3120244049MaRDI QIDQ2051206

Tomislav Herceg, Ilko Vrankić, Mirjana Pejić Bach

Publication date: 24 November 2021

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-020-00713-6

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryduopolycooperative strategydominant strategyreactive strategythe tit-for-tat strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Related Items (1)

Methodologies and applications for resilient global development from the aspect of SDI-SOR special issues of CJOR

Cites Work

• A dynamic Stackelberg duopoly model with different strategies
• Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence
• Game theory applied to dynamic duopoly problems with production constraints
• Price competition in a nonlinear differentiated duopoly
• Dynamics of a Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality based on relative profit maximization
• Cheating as a dynamic marketing strategy in monopoly, cartel and duopoly
• A dynamic Cournot duopoly model with different strategies
• Game Theory in Action
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