The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent

DOI10.1007/S00182-021-00774-0zbMath1475.91034OpenAlexW3153667953MaRDI QIDQ2051507

Christoph Kuzmics, Christoph Diehl

Publication date: 24 November 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00774-0

zbMATH Keywords

communicationrobustnessinformation transmissioncheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games

Cites Work

• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
• Strategic Information Transmission
• A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Robust Mechanism Design
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

This page was built for publication: The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent