Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
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Publication:2051512
DOI10.1007/s00182-021-00777-xzbMath1478.91135OpenAlexW3162859238MaRDI QIDQ2051512
Yasunori Okumura, Minoru Kitahara
Publication date: 24 November 2021
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00777-x
Related Items (2)
Corrigendum to: ``Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties ⋮ School choice with transferable student characteristics
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