Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games

DOI10.1007/S00182-021-00779-9zbMath1478.91014OpenAlexW3161640048MaRDI QIDQ2051514

Chihiro Morooka

Publication date: 24 November 2021

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00779-9

zbMATH Keywords

intertemporal tradefolk theoremoverlapping generations gamesdiscounted gamesrectangular hull

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economic growth models (91B62) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Overlapping generations games with growing payoffs

Cites Work

• Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
• A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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