Deterministic state-based information disclosure policies and social welfare maximization in strategic queueing systems
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Publication:2052421
DOI10.1007/s11134-020-09674-8OpenAlexW3113113411MaRDI QIDQ2052421
Publication date: 26 November 2021
Published in: Queueing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11134-020-09674-8
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Cites Work
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