Equilibrium in a finite capacity \(M/M/1\) queue with unknown service rates consisting of strategic and non-strategic customers

DOI10.1007/s11134-020-09671-xzbMath1475.60188OpenAlexW3093355726MaRDI QIDQ2052424

S. Srivatsa Srinivas, Rahul R. Marathe

Publication date: 26 November 2021

Published in: Queueing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11134-020-09671-x

zbMATH Keywords

service operationsstrategic behaviorqueueing gamethreshold strategy equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queueing theory (aspects of probability theory) (60K25) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

Unnamed Item ⋮ To incentivize the fast server or not? Firm's dilemma when queue signals service rate in high-contact services

Cites Work

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