Cartel formation in Cournot competition with asymmetric costs: a partition function approach

DOI10.3390/g12010014zbMath1478.91109OpenAlexW3127886909MaRDI QIDQ2052495

Takaaki Abe

Publication date: 26 November 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010014

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityCournot competitioncartel formationpartition function form game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (max. 100)

Cournot's oligopoly equilibrium under different expectations and differentiated production

Cites Work

• A dynamic approach to cartel formation
• A recursive core for partition function form games
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
• Consistency and the core in games with externalities
• Partition function form games. Coalitional games with externalities
• Games in sequencing situations with externalities
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities
• Monotonic core allocation paths for assignment games
• Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions

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