Optimal incentives schemes under \textit{Homo moralis} preferences

DOI10.3390/g12010028zbMath1478.91102OpenAlexW3136729956MaRDI QIDQ2052518

Roberto Sarkisian

Publication date: 26 November 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010028

zbMATH Keywords

optimal contractsmoral hazard in teams\textit{Homo moralis} preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Overconfidence and moral hazard
• Evolution and Kantian morality
• Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Fairness and Contract Design
• The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
• Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching

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