Stability and median rationalizability for aggregate matchings

DOI10.3390/g12020033zbMath1478.91130OpenAlexW3156986745MaRDI QIDQ2052526

SangMok Lee, M. Bumin Yenmez, Matthew Shum, Federico Echenique

Publication date: 26 November 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020033

zbMATH Keywords

latticerationalizabilityaggregate matchingmedian stable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Revealed Preference Theory
• Partial Identification in Two-sided Matching Models
• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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