Private value takeover auctions with toeholds: an experimental study

DOI10.3390/g12020040zbMath1479.91148OpenAlexW3159081779MaRDI QIDQ2052535

Yuri Khoroshilov, Anna Dodonova

Publication date: 26 November 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020040

zbMATH Keywords

auctiontakeovertoehold

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Cites Work

• Jump bidding in ascending auctions: the case of takeover contests
• Participation Costs and Inefficiency in Takeover Contests
• A Theory of Costly Sequential Bidding*
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

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