Deterrence by collective punishment may work against criminals but never against freedom fighters

DOI10.3390/g12020041zbMath1479.91010OpenAlexW3158318978MaRDI QIDQ2052536

Friedel Bolle

Publication date: 26 November 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020041

zbMATH Keywords

resistancepublic goodcollective punishmentpublic bad

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection

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