Reactive strategies: an inch of memory, a mile of equilibria

DOI10.3390/G12020042zbMath1479.91004OpenAlexW3162962776MaRDI QIDQ2052537

A. P. Baklanov

Publication date: 26 November 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020042

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriuminfinitely repeated games1-memory or memory-one strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Reactive learning strategies for iterated games
• Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly

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