Quantile stable mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2052538
DOI10.3390/g12020043zbMath1479.91234OpenAlexW3162333146MaRDI QIDQ2052538
Publication date: 26 November 2021
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020043
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (2)
Median stable matchings in two-sided markets ⋮ Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- An experiment on a core controversy
- Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Median stable matching for markets with wages
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- Core-selecting package auctions
- Median stable matching for college admissions
- The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and Its Applications
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Assortative Matching With Large Firms
- Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
This page was built for publication: Quantile stable mechanisms
