Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling

DOI10.1007/S11229-017-1536-3zbMath1474.91021OpenAlexW2746288880MaRDI QIDQ2052673

Peter J. Lewis, Don Fallis

Publication date: 26 November 2021

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13337/1/deceptivesynthesefinal.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

sender-receiver gamesmisinformationdeceptive signalsfunctional deceptionmeasures of inaccuracysignaling theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Deception in sender-receiver games
• Attitudes toward epistemic risk and the value of experiments
• Deterministic Chaos and the Evolution of Meaning
• Behavioural Deception and Formal Models of Communication
• Information and Inaccuracy
• Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
• Content in Simple Signalling Systems

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