Truthmaker maximalism and the truthmaker paradox

DOI10.1007/s11229-018-01980-2zbMath1475.03012OpenAlexW2899280084WikidataQ128999719 ScholiaQ128999719MaRDI QIDQ2054151

Elke Brendel

Publication date: 1 December 2021

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01980-2

zbMATH Keywords

liar paradoxtruthmakerGödel sentencetruthmaker maximalismtruthmaker necessitarianismtruthmaker paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items

Introduction to the special issue ``Logical perspectives on science and cognition

Cites Work

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