The political (in)stability of funded social security

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2021.104237zbMath1478.91159OpenAlexW3203818941WikidataQ115255870 ScholiaQ115255870MaRDI QIDQ2054828

Oliwia Komada, Joanna Tyrowicz, Krzysztof Makarski, Roel M. W. J. Beetsma

Publication date: 3 December 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104237

zbMATH Keywords

social securitywelfarefundingpay-as-you-gomajority voteasset capture

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Cites Work

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• Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
• Public trust and government betrayal
• A Median Voter Model of Social Security
• On financing retirement with an aging population

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