Four ways in which theories of belief revision could benefit from theories of epistemic justification

DOI10.1007/s10670-018-0028-2zbMath1475.03028OpenAlexW2857944634WikidataQ129561890 ScholiaQ129561890MaRDI QIDQ2055923

Gordian Haas

Publication date: 1 December 2021

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0028-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (1)

JuDAS: a theory of rational belief revision

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