A note on the unprovability of consistency in formal theories of truth

DOI10.1007/S10992-021-09600-0OpenAlexW3164758602MaRDI QIDQ2056216

Kevin J. Davey

Publication date: 2 December 2021

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09600-0

zbMATH Keywords

truthGödel's second incompleteness theoremHartry Field

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical logic and foundations (03-XX)

Cites Work

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• Proof theory. 2nd ed
• An axiomatic approach to self-referential truth
• Handbook of proof theory
• Disquotation and infinite conjunctions
• An ordinal analysis for theories of self-referential truth
• Truth and disquotation
• Arithmetical Reflection and the Provability of Soundness
• Reflecting on incompleteness

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