Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation

DOI10.1007/S00712-020-00713-9zbMath1476.91084OpenAlexW3047162949MaRDI QIDQ2056858

Carsten Helm, Franz Wirl

Publication date: 8 December 2021

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-020-00713-9

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelmulti-taskingwork ethicintrinsic motiveobservation-equivalent out-of-contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Voluntary internalisations facing the threat of a pollution tax
• Are two a good representative for many?
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Multilateral externalities: contracts with private information either about costs or benefits
• On countervailing incentives
• Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
• On the Equivalence of General and Specific Control in Organizations
• WAGE FLOORS, IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES, AND OPTIMAL JOB DESIGN
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

This page was built for publication: Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation