On the characterization of saddle point equilibrium for security games with additive utility

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-64793-3_19zbMath1483.91012arXiv2007.14478OpenAlexW3127702144MaRDI QIDQ2056958

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 8 December 2021

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.14478

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexityNash equilibriumzero-sum gamesecurity game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Combinatorial games (91A46)

Cites Work

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• Designing Virus-Resistant, High-Performance Networks: A Game-Formation Approach

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