Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102534zbMath1479.91055OpenAlexW3161704112MaRDI QIDQ2057253

Xiaoye Liao

Publication date: 9 December 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102534

zbMATH Keywords

continuous-time modelBayesian persuasionoptimal learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Persuasion under costly learning
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Strategic Experimentation
• The Optimal Level of Experimentation
• Foundations of a General Theory of Sequential Decision Functions

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