Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability

DOI10.1007/S00712-021-00737-9zbMath1479.91175OpenAlexW3148968433MaRDI QIDQ2058508

Wen Zhou, Jiajia Cong

Publication date: 9 December 2021

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-021-00737-9

zbMATH Keywords

limited liabilityoptimal contractdouble moral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
• Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

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