Will managerial delegation impede upstream collusion?

DOI10.1007/s00712-021-00741-zzbMath1479.91192OpenAlexW3157256965MaRDI QIDQ2058515

Leonard F. S. Wang, Han Wang

Publication date: 9 December 2021

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-021-00741-z

zbMATH Keywords

price competitiondelegationcollusionvertical channel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Extended games played by managerial firms with asymmetric costs
• Dynamic Bertrand oligopoly
• Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs
• Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited
• Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization
• Post-merger internal organization in multitier decentralized supply chains
• Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives
• PRICE AND QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS IN A MIXED DUOPOLY: A TECHNICAL NOTE

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