Strategic trade policy with interlocking cross-ownership

DOI10.1007/S00712-021-00745-9zbMath1476.91091OpenAlexW3164051305MaRDI QIDQ2058517

Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti

Publication date: 9 December 2021

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-021-00745-9

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmaCournot duopolyexport subsidyinterlocking cross-ownership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

Vertical cross‐ownership, input price discrimination, and social welfare ⋮ Effects of partial passive ownership in a successive endogenous timing game with R&D spillovers ⋮ Quid pro quo CSR and trade liberalization in a bilateral monopoly

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• International cross-ownership of firms and strategic privatization policy
• Interlocking cross-ownership in a unionised duopoly: when social welfare benefits from ``more collusion
• Product innovation transfer under passive partial ownership holdings
• Ownership relations in the presence of cross-shareholding
• Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly
• Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The Case of the U.S. Automobile Industry

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