Optimal sickness benefits in a principal-agent model

DOI10.1007/S00355-020-01307-6zbMath1479.91179OpenAlexW3107519732MaRDI QIDQ2058837

Sébastien Ménard

Publication date: 10 December 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01307-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• On the uniform convergence of the Chebyshev interpolants for solitons
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
• Absenteeism, Efficiency Wages and Shirking
• On Moral Hazard and Insurance

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