Axiomatizations of the proportional division value

DOI10.1007/S00355-020-01299-3zbMath1479.91160OpenAlexW2991691008MaRDI QIDQ2058838

Youngsub Chun, Zhengxing Zou, Yukihiko Funaki, René van den Brink

Publication date: 10 December 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01299-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (6)

Sharing the surplus and proportional values ⋮ Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions ⋮ Explanation of pseudo-Boolean functions using cooperative game theory and prime implicants ⋮ Optimal strategies and profit allocation for three-echelon food supply chain in view of cooperative games with cycle communication structure ⋮ Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances

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