Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs

DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01304-9zbMath1479.91113OpenAlexW3118498665MaRDI QIDQ2058839

Dipjyoti Majumdar, Arunava Sen

Publication date: 10 December 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01304-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains

Cites Work

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• Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
• Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules

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