Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects
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Publication:2058845
DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01303-wzbMath1479.91157OpenAlexW3130134335MaRDI QIDQ2058845
Bettina Klaus, Alexandru Nichifor
Publication date: 10 December 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01303-w
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