Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects

DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01303-wzbMath1479.91157OpenAlexW3130134335MaRDI QIDQ2058845

Bettina Klaus, Alexandru Nichifor

Publication date: 10 December 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01303-w

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
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• Consistent house allocation
• Queue allocation of indivisible goods
• Consistency in house allocation problems
• Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
• Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
• No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
• Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities

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