Dynamic communication mechanism design
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Publication:2058846
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01309-yzbMath1479.91071OpenAlexW3133924690MaRDI QIDQ2058846
Publication date: 10 December 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01309-y
Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
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- Communication and efficiency in auctions
- Asking questions
- Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders
- The communication cost of selfishness
- The private value single item bisection auction
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains
- Optimal Voting Rules
- Credible Auctions: A Trilemma
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