Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
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Publication:2058847
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01316-zzbMath1479.91114OpenAlexW3133599634MaRDI QIDQ2058847
Zéphirin Nganmeni, Mathieu Martin, Craig A. Tovey
Publication date: 10 December 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01316-z
Related Items
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