Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01316-zzbMath1479.91114OpenAlexW3133599634MaRDI QIDQ2058847

Zéphirin Nganmeni, Mathieu Martin, Craig A. Tovey

Publication date: 10 December 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01316-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Generalized medians and a political center

Cites Work

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