Auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction: an experimental investigation
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01318-xzbMath1479.91152OpenAlexW3137124359MaRDI QIDQ2058861
Publication date: 10 December 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01318-x
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
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