On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01329-8zbMath1479.91132OpenAlexW3137319819MaRDI QIDQ2058863

Cuiling Zhang, Takashi Kunimoto

Publication date: 10 December 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2212

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents

Cites Work

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