On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
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Publication:2058863
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01329-8zbMath1479.91132OpenAlexW3137319819MaRDI QIDQ2058863
Cuiling Zhang, Takashi Kunimoto
Publication date: 10 December 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2212
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Cites Work
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