An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01327-wzbMath1479.91112OpenAlexW3142515276MaRDI QIDQ2058868

Justin Kruger, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 10 December 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/22254

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Majority-approval social choice ⋮ The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking ⋮ A non-lexicographic rule in the preference-approval setting ⋮ A family of distances for preference-approvals

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A general scoring rule
• Dis\&approval voting: a characterization
• The Borda majority count
• A `threshold aggregation' of three-graded rankings
• Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others
• On the theory of aggregation
• The Bordes-LeBreton exceptional case
• Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting
• Arrow's theorem as a corollary
• The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory
• Majority judgment vs. majority rule
• The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
• Information and preference aggregation
• Formal utilitarianism and range voting
• Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
• A theorem on aggregating classifications
• Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference
• Possibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels
• On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
• A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

This page was built for publication: An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation