An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
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Publication:2058868
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01327-wzbMath1479.91112OpenAlexW3142515276MaRDI QIDQ2058868
Justin Kruger, M. Remzi Sanver
Publication date: 10 December 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.psl.eu/handle/123456789/22254
Related Items (4)
Majority-approval social choice ⋮ The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking ⋮ A non-lexicographic rule in the preference-approval setting ⋮ A family of distances for preference-approvals
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