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Publication:2058870
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01328-9zbMath1479.91233OpenAlexW3139706312MaRDI QIDQ2058870
Francisco Martínez-Mora, Caterina Calsamiglia, Antonio Miralles
Publication date: 10 December 2021
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01328-9
Cites Work
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Robust Mechanism Design
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