When the state does not play dice: aggressive audit strategies foster tax compliance

DOI10.1007/S00355-021-01325-YzbMath1479.91227OpenAlexW3147573424MaRDI QIDQ2058874

Eugenio Verrina, Matteo Ploner, Luigi Mittone

Publication date: 10 December 2021

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01325-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• The efficiency of crackdowns: a lab-in-the-field experiment in public transportations
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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