Language and coordination games

DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01279-9zbMath1479.91057OpenAlexW2244665191MaRDI QIDQ2059053

Melody Lo

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/114954

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionweak dominancelanguagecheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Linguistics (91F20)

Cites Work

• A note on pre-play communication
• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
• Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
• Communication between rational agents
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
• Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
• Admissibility in Games
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Language and coordination games