Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program
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Publication:2059096
DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00245-8zbMath1479.91237OpenAlexW3129962344MaRDI QIDQ2059096
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00245-8
Cites Work
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- MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM*
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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