Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem

DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00246-7zbMath1479.91159OpenAlexW3135704311MaRDI QIDQ2059097

Rasoul Ramezanian, Mehdi Feizi

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00246-7

zbMATH Keywords

random assignment problemfavoring higher ranksinterim favoring ranksex-post favoring ranksrobust ex-post favoring ranks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms ⋮ The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks

Cites Work

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• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• The modified Boston mechanism
• Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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