Competitive equilibria and benefit distributions of population production economies with external increasing returns
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Publication:2059182
DOI10.1007/s40305-021-00340-1zbMath1488.91062OpenAlexW3137584873MaRDI QIDQ2059182
Publication date: 13 December 2021
Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-021-00340-1
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